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Abstract Pollution and environmental protection in the
present century are extremely significant global problems.
Power plants as the largest pollution emitting industry have
been the cause of a great deal of scientific researches. The
fuel or source type used to generate electricity by the power
plants plays an important role in the amount of pollution
produced. Governments should take visible actions to
promote green fuel. These actions are often called the
governmental financial interventions that include legisla-
tions such as green subsidiaries and taxes. In this paper, by
considering the government role in the competition of two
power plants, we propose a game theoretical model that
will help the government to determine the optimal taxes
and subsidies. The numerical examples demonstrate how
government could intervene in a competitive market of
electricity to achieve the environmental objectives and how
power plants maximize their utilities in each energy source.
The results also reveal that the government’s taxes and
subsidiaries effectively influence the selected fuel types of
power plants in the competitive market.
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i; j The indexes of the competitive power plant
k; l The indexes of the energy source used by the power plant
Parameters
Cik The unit production cost of the power plant i when
using the energy source k, Cik [ 0
Fik The initial setup fee of the power plant i when using
the energy source k, Fik [ 0
wik The pollution amount that the power plant i
produces when using the energy source k, wik [ 0
~aikl The stochastic market base for the power plant i when
using the energy source k and the power plant j using
the energy source l. ~aikl is defined as a random variable
with the mean aikl and the variance r2ikl
kikl The constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) of the
power plant i when using the energy source k and
the power plant j using the energy source l, kikl [ 0
LBG The lower bound of the government’s profit
Ri The reservation utility of power plant i
s The confidence level provided as an appropriate
safety margin for the profit by the government
bikl The demand sensitivity of power plant i to its own
price when using the energy source k and the power
plant j using the energy source l, bikl [ 0
cikl The demand sensitivity of power plant i to the
rival’s price, when using the energy source k and the
power plant j using the energy source l, cikl [ 0
Variables
pikl The power plant i’s electricity price when using the
energy source k and the power plant j using the
energy source l
R. Mahmoudi  A. Hafezalkotob (&)
Department of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University,





Department of Industrial Engineering, Iran University of Science
and Technology, 16846113114 Tehran, Iran
123
J Ind Eng Int (2014) 10:59
DOI 10.1007/s40092-014-0059-5
Sikl The subsidy provided by the government for the
power plant i when using the energy source k and the
power plant j using the energy source l, Sikl  0
Tikl The tax imposed by the government on the power
plant i when using the energy source k and the power
plant j using the energy source l, Tikl  0
~Dikl The demand of power plant i, when using the energy
source k and the power plant j using the energy
source l
Introduction
Electricity is the cornerstone of health care, sanitation
services, and the educational, economic, scientific, and
agricultural progresses that characterize a modern society.
Indeed, there are few goods or services that do not directly
depend on electricity in developing and developed coun-
tries (Nagurney et al. 2006). The electricity industry is
growing and the global electricity consumption in 2025 is
estimated to be around 23.1 trillion kWh. (See Casazza and
Delea 2003; Singh 1999 and Zaccour 1998, for detailed
information regarding electric power industry and its
market).
Despite the major positive effects of electrical energy on
economic growth, its heavy reliance on fossil fuel makes
dipterous impacts on the environment. The scientific
community is pointing to an increase in human-induced
green house gases (GHGs) (such as CO2, CH4, NOx, and
halo carbons) over the past century as the major cause of
climatic change. Due to fossil fuel combustion, the elec-
tricity generation sector is a major producer of the GHGs
(Palmer and Burtraw 2005). In general, Fossil fuels,
including coal, are expected to be used in 36 % of elec-
tricity production in 2020. More than a third of the total
carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide emission in the US is
attributed for generating electricity. Similarly in China, the
electric power sector currently accounts for more than
one-third of its annual coal consumption, while such
power plants generate over 75 % of the air pollution
(cf. Pew Center). Given that global electricity demand is
increasing by 2.4 % each year, and it is accompanied by
rising global emissions of the GHGs, the current central-
ized generation system should be re-evaluated (Colson and
Nehrir 2009). Therefore, several researches such as Poterba
(1993) and Cline (1992) suggest that any policy in elec-
tricity industry should be made with regard to emissions of
the generated GHGs and their effects on global warming
and immense risks of unstable climate changes.
Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN) (2005) and Euro-
pean Environment Agency (EEA) (2007) have followed
various GHGs reduction strategies. Some power plants
have already started to build up and use sequestration
facilities to capture the generated carbon dioxide (NRCAN
2006). In addition, there has been a significant growth in
the use of electricity generation technologies that utilize
renewable energy sources, which are less-GHG-intensive
(Tampier 2002; Canada 2003; EurObserv’ER 2007; EIA
2008). According to the Kyoto protocol in 1992 (Yoo and
Kwak 2009), the governments should take actions to raise
the percentage of green electricity supply. Green electricity
is the energy that is generated from renewable sources such
as solar power, wind power, small-scale hydroelectric
power, tidal power, and biomass power. These sources
mostly do not produce pollutants; hence, they are called
environmentally friendly. Renewable energies are regarded
as a key factor in tackling global climate changes and
energy shortage crisis (Guler 2009). Renewable energies,
such as wind, have globally experienced fast growth during
the past decade (Li and Shi 2010; Saidur et al. 2010). Green
energy sources involve employing the state-of-the art
technologies; therefore, these energy sources are, gener-
ally, more costly than the fossil energy sources. To pro-
mote green electricity, the government should take visible
actions to compensate for the extra production costs (Yoo
and Kwak 2009). These actions are often called the gov-
ernmental financial interventions. These interventions are
usually in the form of legislations on green energy
subsidiaries and tax tariffs. For example, the pollution
taxes, in particular, carbon taxes are a powerful policy
mechanism that can address market failures in energy
industry (Wu et al. 2006). Painuly (2001) pointed to
encouraging power generation from renewable sources
such as solar and wind powers through the use of green
credits issued by the government. Such credits are now
being utilized in the European Union as well as in several
states of the US (see RECS 1999; Schaeffer et al. 1999).
Consistent with the leading role of the government, the
organizations show growing interest in green energy pro-
duction. On the other hand, raising the awareness of the
electricity consumers leads to the genesis of the concept of
green branding and green consumerism (Barari et al. 2012).
Specifically, this research uses the mathematical game
theory model to answer the following questions:
1. Which financial instruments are effective in maximiz-
ing the impact of interventions of the government?
2. What are the competitive responses of the power plants
against government financial interventions? (2) What
are the best strategies that simultaneously optimize
government objective and power plant’s profit?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
‘‘Literature review’’: briefly discusses the related literature.
‘‘The model’’ presents the proposed model and derives
equilibrium solutions. In ‘‘Numerical example’’, a numer-
ical example is presented. Concluding remarks and
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suggestions for the future research are given in ‘‘Summary
and conclusion’’.
Literature review
The struggle between economy and environment has led
managerial researches to promote methodologies that their
goal is to achieve profits by preserving the sustainability of
the environment. The electricity-generating plants, as the
largest pollution emitting industry, have encouraged many
scientific researches. Accordingly, governments and policy
makers have been concentrating on renewable energy,
which is regarded as environmentally sustainable energy.
The renewable energy creates several public benefits, such
as environmental improvement (reduction of power plant
greenhouse emissions and thermal and noise pollution),
increased fuel diversity, reduction of the effects of energy
price’s volatility on the economy, and national economic
security (Menegaki 2007).
There are innumerable research papers on competition
between two power plants. Some papers deal with either
quantity competition or price competition. Their primary
focus is on applying the game theory to derive equilibrium
under varied assumptions (Liu et al. 2007). Menniti et al.
(2008) suggested the evolutionary game model to obtain
near Nash equilibrium when more than two producers exist
in the electricity market. Jia and Yokoyama (2003) dis-
cussed the cooperation of the independent power producers
in retail market and calculated the profits of producers.
They proposed a schema for allocation of extra profit of
coalition among power producers. Some researchers
applied game theory models in electricity market auction
(see Gan et al. 2005a, b).
Some researchers have concentrated on the role of the
green policy of the governments in polluting industries.
Dong et al. (2010) presented a framework for analyzing the
conflicts between a local government and a potentially
pollution producer using the game theory. They investi-
gated the effects of the subsidies and penalties policies on
the implementation of cleaner production. Sheu and Chen
(2012) analyzed the effects of the governmental financial
intervention on green supply chain’s competition using a
three-stage game-theoretic model. Analytical results
showed that governments should adopt green taxation and
subsidization to ensure profitability of the production of
green products.
Owing to occasional factors or events, market demand
becomes highly uncertain across many industries. The
retail price, market demand, and production cost are often
uncertain when a firm determines the decisions in pro-
duction planning and plant dimensioning (Alonso-Ayuso
et al. 2005). A few papers added demand uncertainty to the
pricing models (Deneckere et al. 1997; Mantrala and
Raman 1999; Dana 2001; Kunnumkal and Topaloglu
2008). We assumed demand uncertainty to electricity
market base for the power plant.
In the power industry, Nagurney et al. (2006) devel-
oped a computational framework for determining the
optimal carbon taxes in the context of electric power
supply chain networks (generation/distribution/consump-
tion). They developed three distinct types of carbon tax-
ation environmental policies. For these taxation schemas,
the behavior of the decision makers in the electric power
supply chain network was analyzed via finite-dimensional
variational inequality technique. The numerical results
showed that the carbon taxation has been effective in
achieving the desired result intended by the policy
makers.
Table 1 demonstrates that the proposed approach of the
paper covers new features in comparison with other
existing models. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no
research was found in the context of electricity market,
which considers responses of the competitive power plants
against the government’s green polices. Due to this gap in
the literature, there are three main contributions in this
research. First, the government is regarded as the leading
player to investigate the impacts of its green legislations
and financial interventions on electricity market. Although
the governmental economic incentives as promoting envi-
ronmental protection have been investigated in some par-
ticular industries (Ulph 1996; Fullerton and Wu 1998;
Walls and Palmer 2001), they have not been studied in the
electricity industry. Based on the emerging worldwide
green legislations, such as WEEE, and the Kyoto global
warming agreement, the involvement of the governments
in energy industry via coercive strategies, including legis-
lations and economic incentives, is indispensable. Second,
it is assumed that there is uncertainty regarding the demand
of electricity because each power plant often take decisions
about electricity planning, capacities and type of sources
long before the real demand of electricity are resolved.
Thus, our model explicitly considers that the electricity
demand which is function of electricity prices is known by
power plants with a level of uncertainty. The demand
uncertainty brings about profit uncertainty of power plants
and they assumed to be risk averse toward their profit
uncertainty. Third, although some research has focused on
green manufacturing/remanufacturing, few studies have
addressed the coordination and competition of the power
plants under the governments’ policies. In this paper, the
role of the government as the Stackelberg leader on the
strategies of the power plants as the Stackelberg followers
is, especially, investigated. A bi-level programming model
is proposed for such hierarchical decision-making
framework.




In this paper, two power plants in a competitive electricity
market are considered, where each power plant has
N options for energy source type. Government imposes
different levels of subsidy or tax for the power plants
regarding their selected energy source type. The govern-
ment aims to reduce pollution of power plants with regard
to specific budget. On the other hand, each power plant
tries to maximize its profit. Figure 1 illustrates a concep-
tual flowchart of this game. The competition between the
power plants can be interpreted as a two-person non-zero
sum game. The principal strategies of power plants are type
of energy sources and their minor strategies are the elec-
tricity prices in the market. These strategies in competitive
electricity market should be adopted with regard to gov-
ernment’s tariffs and market responses.
The proposed models are established upon the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1 We assume that the competitive power
plants follow the government’s financial legislations and
have the capability to produce electricity using different
energy sources.
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Assumption 2 The market competition environment
between two power plants is consistent with assumptions of
Bertrand’s model of oligopoly. The power plants jointly set
the price that maximizes their own profits. The demand
function for each power plant is contingence upon elec-
tricity prices which assumed continuous and linear.
Assumption 3 The competitive power plants are able to
set up facilities for generating electricity from the specific
sources. When the power plants install and start up the
corresponding power generations instruments, the produc-
tion capacity is ample for market demand.
Assumption 4 The production rate of the power plants is
equal to the corresponding demand rate. Moreover, they
have negligible internal consumption and waste rate.
Assumption 5 The time order of this game is assumed as
follows:
Stage 1 The government determines their taxes and
tariffs based on the goal of minimizing the pollution by
speculating about the potential reactions of the power
plants in the bargaining context.
Stage 2 Both of the competing power plants determine
the pricing strategies for the consumers. The power plants
then determine the utility of each fuel type. Finally, based
on the bargaining game, the equilibrium solutions are
found.
The indexes, parameters and variables used in the model
formulae are given in list of symbols.
Power plant’s model
Demand
In the new deregulated environment, the price of the
electricity is no longer set by the regulators; instead, it is
set by the market forces (Skantze and Gubina 2000). The
Demand function for each power plant is assumed con-
tinuous which takes the following forms:
~Dikl ¼ ~aikl  biklpikl þ cjklpjkl
for i 6¼ j; j; s 2 1; 2f g and k; l ¼ 1; . . .; n; ð1Þ
This function is a class of a more general linear demand
functions used in many of the previous studies (McGuire
and Staelin 1983; Choi 1991; Shy 2003). The differentia-
tion parameters of the two power plants, bikl and cjkl are
independent and positive values. The power plant with
larger aikl has a relative advantage of accessing customer
due to a better brand, position, quality, reputation and so
on. The function (1) means that the market demand of each
power plant is an increasing function of its rival price, but a
decreasing function of its own price. Moreover, ~aikl and ~ajkl
are assumed independent stochastic variables, thus
covð~aikl; ~ajklÞ ¼ 0.
Profit function
The profit function for each power plant is formulated as
follows:
~Pikl ¼ ðpiklCikTikl þ SiklÞ ~DiklFik
i ¼ 1; 2 k; l ¼ 1; . . .; n ð2Þ
This function shows that each power plant’s profit
depends on the amount of its demand, price the initial setup
and the unit production cost, as well as the government’s
tax and subsidy. Note that tax reduces marginal profit,
however, subsidy increases the marginal profit of the power
plant.
Utility function
It is known that the power plants would be at risk from
demand of new fuel system. By considering the risk sen-
sitivity of the power plants, it is assumed that each power
plant assesses its utility via the following Mean–Variance
value function of its random profit (Agrawal and Seshadri
2000; Tsay 2002; Gan et al. 2005a, b; Lee and Schwarz
2007; Xiao and Yang 2008):
Fig. 1 A conceptual framework
of the game
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Uð ~PiklÞ ¼ Eð ~PiklÞ  kiklvarð ~PiklÞ i ¼ 1; 2 k; l ¼ 1; . . .; n
ð3Þ
where the second term is the risk cost of the power plant i,
and kikl reflects the attitude of the power plant i towards
uncertainty. Equation (3) means that the power plant i will
make a trade-off between the mean and the variance of its
random profit. The larger the CARA, kikl , of the power
plant i, the more conservative its behavior will be. Based
on the Eqs. (2) and (3), we have:
Uð ~PiklÞ ¼ ðpikl þ SiklTiklCikÞðaikl biklpikl þ cjklpjklÞ
 kiklðpikl þ SiklTiklCikÞ2r2iklFik
i ¼ 1; 2 k; l ¼ 1; . . .; n ð4Þ
In this study, this utility is considered as the payoff of
power plant. The game is a non-zero-sum game, because a
gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with a
loss by another.
Government’s model
Government as well as the other player aims to take
measures which optimizes the pollution level and the profit.
The proposed model for the government can be expressed
as:
min ðwik ~Dikl þwjl ~DjklÞ i 6¼ j; i; j2 1;2f g;k; l 2 1; . . .;nf g
s:t Pr ðTiklSiklÞ ~Dikl þðTjklSjklÞ ~DjklLbG
 s
ðpiklCikTikl þ SiklÞDikl  kiklðpiklCikTikl þ SiklÞ2r2iklFikRi
ðpjklCjlTjkl þ SjklÞDjkl  kjklðpjklCjlTjkl þ SjklÞ2r2jklFjlRj
Tikl; Tjkl; Sikl; Sjkl0 ð5Þ
In this optimization problem, the objective function
represents the total pollution emitted by power plants.
According to green policy, the government would mini-
mize the total emitted pollution. The first constraint assures
the government’s revenue from the power plants dose not
lower than a lower bound with probability s. The second
and third constraints are individual rational constraints (IR)
under which the power plants would like to accept
government’s tariffs; otherwise, the power plants will
reject the tariffs and withdraw from the electricity market.
In other words, IR constraints guarantee that the power
plants would like to have long-term relationship with the
government.
Nash equilibrium point
The fundamental solution concept in the game theory is a
Nash equilibrium (NE) point where each agent’s strategy is
the best response to the strategies of the others. Each player
has no motivation to deviate from the NE strategy, because
it would lead to a decrease of its expected payoff. The NE
of the game is formally defined as follows (Krause et al.
2006):
In a n-person game, the strategy profile p ¼ ðp1; . . .; pnÞ
is a NE if for all i 2 1; . . .; nf g we have:
Uiðp1; . . .; pnÞUi p1; . . .; pi1; pi; piþ1; . . .; pn
  ð6Þ
Several algorithms have been developed for computing
NE. The interested reader may refer to Krause et al. (2004)
and Porter et al. (2004). In this study, we use NE approach
for the Bertrand game to calculate the price equilibrium of
electricity in a competitive market.
Bertrand game
Consider the simultaneous-move game where the power
plant i ði ¼ 1; 2Þ independently chooses pi. Let ðp1; p2Þ be
the Bertrand equilibrium prices which are obtained from
the first-order condition given by oUiðpi; pjÞ=opi ¼
0 ði = 1; 2; i 6¼ jÞ (Vives 1985).
Lemma 1 According to Eq. 4, using the Bertrand equa-
tion, the equilibrium price for each one of the power plants
under given government policies could be found as follows
pikl ¼ Mikl  Sikl þ Tikl þ Cik




2ðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ½aikl þ biklðSiklTiklCikÞ  cjklðSjklTjklCjlÞ
þcjkl½ajkl þ bjklðSjklTjklCjlÞ  ciklðSiklTiklCikÞ
( )
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
;
Mjkl ¼
2ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞ½ajkl þ bjklðSjklTjklCjkÞ  ciklðSiklTiklCilÞ
þcikl½aikl þ biklðSiklTiklCilÞ  cjklðSjklTjklCjkÞ
( )
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
:
ð8Þ
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Proofs of all the Lemmas and propositions are given in
Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 The optimal power plants’ utility at the
equilibrium price for the given government’s polices is
formulated as follows:
Uð ePiklÞ ¼ ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞM 2ikl  Fik ;
i ¼ 1; 2; k; l ¼ 1; ::; n: ð9Þ
Government model in equilibrium prices
To obtain the government’s optimal policy, the govern-
ment’s model at the equilibrium prices should be solved.
According to Eqs. (1), (5), (7) and (9), we derive the fol-
lowing Lemma:
Lemma 2 The government’s model at the equilibrium
prices is formulated as follows:
where
C ¼ wik ~aikl þ wjl~ajkl þ ðwjlciklwikbiklÞDikl
þ ðwikcjklwjl bjklÞDjkl ð11Þ
gikl ¼ ðhiklðwjlciklwikbiklÞ þ viklðwikcjklwjl bjklÞ
 ðwjlciklwikbiklÞÞ ð12Þ
Dikl ¼
2ðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞaikl þ cjklajkl
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð13Þ
hikl ¼
ð2biklðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð14Þ
vjkl ¼
ð2cjklðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ þ cjklbjklÞ
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð15Þ
The final model has a linear objective function and a
set of non-linear constraints. The first constraint is sto-
chastic constraint which can transformed into a certain
constraint.
Lemma 3 The government’s first constraint is equal to
ðTikl  SiklÞaikl þ ðTjkl  SjklÞajkl
þ ðTjklSjklÞciklðTiklSiklÞbikl
 
Dikl þ ðhikl  1Þð




















where / is the standardized normal distribution.
Bargaining game
The goal of the Nash bargaining game, as a cooperative
game, is dividing the benefits or utility between two
players based on their competition in the market place. The
Nash bargaining game model (Nash 1950) requires the
feasible set to be compact and convex. It contains some
payoff vectors, so that each individual payoff is greater
than the individual breakdown payoff. Breakdown Payoffs
are the starting point for bargaining which represent the
possible payoff pairs obtained if one player decides not to
bargain with the other player. In this study, the equilibrium
point of the game is achieved using the Nash bargaining
game. It is believed that a power plant dose not stay in the
business unless it can meet its minimum needs; therefore,
min Cþ giklðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ þ gjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ i 6¼ j; i; j 2 1; 2f g; k; l 2 1; . . .; nf g
s:t Pr
ðTikl  SiklÞ~aikl þ ðTjkl  SjklÞ~ajklþ
ððTjkl  SjklÞcikl  ðTikl  SiklÞbiklÞðDikl þ ðhikl  1ÞðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ þ vjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞÞþ

























Tikl; Tjkl; Sikl; Sjkl  0 ð10Þ
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the breakdown point of the game for each plant depends on
its individual policy.
If Uikl is the optimal utility function for the power plant i
and Ujkl is the optimal utility function for the player j, they
will maximize ðUikl  RiÞðUjkl  RjÞ, where Ri and Rj, are
reservation utilities (breakdown points) for the power
plants. That is the power plants would withdraw from the
competitive market, if they obtain optimal utilities lower
than the reservation utilities (i.e., Uikl Ri and Ujkl Rj).
Therefore, according to the Nash bargaining procedure, the
source selection model of the power plants is given by
max ðUikl  RiÞðUjkl  RjÞ i 6¼ j
s:t Uikl [ Ri
Ujkl [ Rj
ð17Þ
The algorithm of the game procedure is as follows: by







jkl are achieved. Afterwards, the
power plants should determine electricity prices for all
possible type of sources with regard to government’s taxes
and subsidies. From problem (7) the equilibrium prices for
each pair of source types, i.e., pikl and p

jkl are calculated.
Then, the optimal strategies for energy sources concerning
the optimal government’s tariffs and equilibrium prices are
obtained from the Nash bargaining problem (17).
Numerical example
In this section, we provide the numerical examples to
discuss how the theoretical results in this paper can be
applied in practice. It is supposed that there are three types
of energy sources for each power plant which include solar,
gas and diesel gas. To demonstrate how the government’s
revenue affects the market equilibrium, we consider three
different examples. These examples are distinctive
according to the minimum acceptable level of govern-
ment’s revenue. The payoff matrix for two-person non-zero
sum game between the plants is shown in Table 2. More-
over, data for this numerical example are presented in
Table 3.
All the calculations are done with MATLAB 14.
According to this data, the values for all the variables were
Table 2 Utility function of
both power plants using the
three different energy sources
where Uð ePiklÞ ¼
ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞM 2ikl  Fik ; i ¼
1; 2; k; l ¼ 1; ::; n:
Energy source Power plant 2
Solar Gas Diesel fuel
Power plant 1
Solar ðUðP111Þ; UðP211ÞÞ ðUðP112Þ; UðP212ÞÞ ðUðP113Þ; UðP213ÞÞ
Gas ðUðP121Þ; UðP221ÞÞ ðUðP122Þ; UðP222ÞÞ ðUðP123Þ; UðP123ÞÞ
Diesel fuel ðUðP131Þ; UðP231ÞÞ ðUðP132Þ; UðP232ÞÞ ðUðP133Þ; UðP233ÞÞ
Table 3 Data of power plant 1





















C1k 6 6 6 8 8 8 10 10 10
C2l 6 9 11 6 9 11 6 9 11
F1k 800 800 800 300 300 300 150 150 150
F2l 1,200 350 200 1,200 350 200 1,200 350 200
W1k 6.3 6.3 6.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 48 48 48
W2l 5.7 30.8 48.14 5.7 30.8 48.14 5.7 30.8 48.14
k1kl 0.3 0.33 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.22
k2kl 0.32 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.23 0.22 0.36 0.24 0.22
b1kl 30 24 21 35 32 30 39 37 35
b2kl 29 32 40 27 33 38 28 31 34
c1kl 42 38 36 43 36 45 47 43 29
c2kl 41 45 49 37 33 40 38 39 31
a1kl 1,200 1,250 1,270 26 1,210 1,220 1,130 1,160 1,100
a2kl 1,810 1,850 1,800 1,820 1,825 1,890 1,860 1,850 1,920
r21kl 20 24 38 26 30 46 40 44 50
r22kl 21 29 24 19 25 28 16 23 40
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computed. The details of calculated values for all the
variables are given in Appendix 2.
Example 1 For the first numerical example, it is supposed
that the government takes account of LbG = 1,000, and
power plants 1 and 2 consider the reservation utility
R1 = 500 and R2 = 800, respectively. The government
model will be, first, solved to get the subsidies and taxes.
Using these values, the equilibrium price is obtained.
Finally, using the Nash bargaining game, the non-zero sum
game will be solved. The calculated values for this
example are summarized in Table 4. The results of opti-
mal, taxes, subsidies, electricity prices, and utility value of
power plant are given in the rows of the table, respectively.
These values are provided for the nine possible combina-
tions of the power plants’ recourses.
The minimum utility of the first and second power plants
for different strategies is 500.4246 and 800.5179, respec-
tively. It is assumed that the power plants would withdraw
from the competitive market; if the power plants obtain the
utility lower than these values (In the real application of the
model, different value for breakdowns can be considered
regarding the individual preferences). Thus, we have
R1 = 500.4246 and R2 = 800.5179.
Regarding these breakdown values, the bargaining game
model can be shown in Table 5.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy is solar–gas. In other
words, if power plant 1 uses solar source and power plant 2
uses gas source, the power plants would obtain maximum
utility.
Example 2 In this example, it is supposed that the gov-
ernment considers LbG = 10,000 and as in the previous
example, power plant 1 considers R1 = 500 and power
plant 2 considers R2 = 800. Then, Table 6 demonstrates
the optimal values for different strategies of power plants.
Similar to the previous example, it is considered that
R1 = 500.4272 and R2 = 800.7171.
Values of the bargaining game model are shown in
Table 7:
Therefore, the equilibrium strategies for the first and
second power plants are solar and gas, respectively.
Table 4 Numerical results for example 1
Energy
source
Solar–solar Solar–gas Solar–diesel Gas–solar Gas–gas Gas–diesel Diesel–solar Diesel–gas Diesel–
diesel
T1kl 0.925 27.745 119.677 333.357 5.657 9.433 144.29 35.372 267.671
T2kl 0.005 103.437 141.298 0.003 0.333 41.836 0.103 6.034 273.347
S1kl 0 55.068 124.896 169.914 0 24.092 0.272 0.188 0
S2kl 0.379 0.002 0 5.884 3.896 0.03 5.36 19.371 0
p1kl 55.6715 105.5519 131.1695 175.8069 44.0521 43.0772 157.6612 65.8186 281.4594
p2kl 61.4076 140.8418 156.9571 140.2412 47.1325 73.4309 137.7303 61.5796 289.1927
UðP1klÞ 8.4754e?004 5.1302e?005 5.8232e?005 502.5792 3.5086e?004 1.0805e?005 500.4246 1.9344e?004 502.4488
UðP2klÞ 1.0995e?005 3.1795e?004 800.5179 6.5569e?005 6.7020e?004 1.8590e?004 6.3231e?005 1.5834e?005 803.6828
Table 5 Numerical results for the Nash bargaining game model in
example 1. (106)
Energy source Power plant 2
Solar Gas Diesel fuel
Power plant 1
Solar 9,196.2 15,885 0
Gas 1.4110 2,290.2 1,913.3
Diesel fuel 0 2,968.6 0.0000064064
Table 6 Numerical results for example 2
Energy
source
Solar–solar Solar–gas Solar–diesel Gas–solar Gas–gas Gas–diesel Diesel–solar Diesel–gas Diesel–
diesel
T1kl 3.152 27.576 119.04 166.467 8.558 9.522 146.838 38.508 267.672
T2kl 1.662 108.336 143.739 2.374 1.076 45.016 52.066 6.506 376.338
S1kl 0.071 53.802 122.862 0 0 22.069 0 0.193 0
S2kl 0.154 0 0 6.717 1.905 0.033 55.732 18.081 102.99
p1kl 58.5190 109.6974 133.8829 178.8311 47.0091 45.9637 160.4813 68.8856 281.4603
p2kl 64.1997 145.7515 159.3987 143.1020 50.0759 76.7115 140.6245 64.3994 289.1936
UðP1klÞ 8.7199e?004 5.3800e?005 5.9415e?005 502.6213 3.5217e?004 1.1146e?005 500.4272 1.9223e?004 502.4241
UðP2klÞ 1.1360e?005 3.1815e?004 800.7171 6.6815e?005 6.7698e?004 1.8780e?004 6.4442e?005 1.6347e?005 803.6486
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Example 3 In this example, it is supposed that the gov-
ernment raises its minimum acceptable revenue to
LbG = 100,000. Other parameters remain the same. The
detailed results of the example are shown in Table 8.
Therefore, as in the previous examples, it is considered
that R1 = 500.4336 and R2 = 800.9081.
Values of the bargaining game model are shown in
Table 9:
Thus, the optimal strategies for first and second power
plants are solar and gas, respectively.
Numerical examples analysis
In the numerical examples, we analyses three levels of
1,000, 10,000 and 100,000 for minimum level of govern-
ment’s revenue. The competitive market condition becomes
more sever, as the government raises the minimum level of
revenue. The results show that the equilibrium strategies for
plants 1 and 2 in these numerical examples are solar and gas,
respectively. This is very close to the government’s green
policy, thus, it is desirable. This model is provided for the
government’s policy so that the power plants under this policy
follow the green policy in each condition.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the change in the net gov-
ernment’s tariffs, ðTikl  SiklÞ, in each energy source type
versus LbG for the power plants 1 and 2, respectively.
Figures 2 and 3 show that the government’s penalties for
the non-green energy sources, always are higher than penalties
for the green energy sources. The increase in LbG will raise the
imposed penalty for the non-green energy sources. Hence,
high tax levels for the non-green energy sources will
encourage the power plants to use the green energy sources.
To draw detailed comparisons among different govern-
ment’s revenue policy, government’s optimal tax and
subsidy are indicated in Table 10.
A simple comparison, between three different condi-
tions, shows that when the government increases its mini-
mum revenue, it would increases the taxes on non-green
energy sources and decreases the subsidies. On contrary,
for the power plants with green energy sources, the gov-
ernment would raises the subsidies and reduces the taxes.
For example in the non-green case (diesel–gas) the gov-
ernment increases the taxes, and in the green case (solar–
gas), it almost sets the high value for the offered subsidies.
Using this methodology, the government would be able to
set the optimum level of subsidies and taxes in competitive
electricity market. On the other hand, the competitive
power plants choose energy sources such that their utility
values become maximum.
Summary and conclusions
This study is a contribution to the growing research on the
development of rigorous mathematical and game theory
frameworks for environmental-energy modeling. The proposed
computational framework helps the governmental policy
Table 7 Numerical results for the Nash bargaining game model in
example 2. (106)
Energy source Power plant 2
Solar Gas Diesel fuel
Power plant 1
Solar 9,779.5 16,670 0
Gas 1.4642 2,322.4 1,995
Diesel fuel 0 3,045.6 0.0000058539
Table 8 Numerical results for example 3
Energy
source
Solar–solar Solar–gas Solar–diesel Gas–solar Gas–gas Gas–diesel Diesel–solar Diesel–gas Diesel–
diesel
T1kl 23.682 25.894 8.897 194.169 37.872 13.659 174.204 66.667 267.672
T2kl 24.236 151.39 165.965 9.745 26.738 77.411 14071.085 8.114 273.347
S1kl 2.291 42.504 0.009 0 1.4 7.386 1.555 0.034 0
S2kl 5.88 0.275 0 0 1.178 4.034 14060.189 0.524 0
p1kl 83.1406 145.9197 158.5796 206.5350 75.4869 71.7145 186.2924 97.6813 281.4601
p2kl 88.6842 188.6242 181.6264 169.3080 78.4564 106.0076 167.1148 92.3828 289.1930
UðP1klÞ 1.1111e?005 7.8127e?005 7.0737e?005 502.8494 3.6548e?004 1.4423e?005 500.4336 2.0130e?004 502.3446
UðP2klÞ 1.4661e?005 3.2029e?004 800.9081 7.8776e?005 7.4321e?004 2.0471e?004 7.6060e?005 2.0945e?005 803.7810
Table 9 Numerical results for the Nash bargaining game model in
example 3. (106)
Energy source Power plant 2
Solar Gas Diesel fuel
Power plant 1
Solar 16,128 24,382 0
Gas 1.9011 2,650.2 2,827.2
Diesel fuel 0 4,095.7 0.0000054901
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makers to determine the optimal tariffs on the power plants in a
competitive electricity market. To be more specific, the model
allows the governmental policy makers to determine the opti-
mal taxes and subsidies for each individual electric power plant
regarding the emitted pollutants. These values depend upon the
minimum level of expected utility of the power plants and the
government’s green policy. The model provides the best
strategy for energy sources of power plants. Three numerical
examples were presented to illustrate the model’s performance
in three different levels of the government’s revenue. These
numerical examples also demonstrate how the policy makers
could determine the optimal taxes and subsidies to achieve the
desired environmental objectives and how the power plants
could maximize their utility in each energy source.
There are several directions and suggestions for future
research. First of all, the proposed model can be easily
extended to the case where more than two power plants exist
with different environmental effects. Second, tax and subsidy
may be incorporated in the prices of electricity, thus customers
are persuaded to use green electricity owning to their com-
petitive price. In this case, the demand functions should be
changed appropriately. Moreover, we assume that the gov-
ernment reduces environmental impacts with regard to spe-
cific revenue. However, it is extremely appealing to
investigate the effects of other objectives of the government
such as revenue seeking behavior. Eventually, it would be
Fig. 2 Change in the
government’s net tariffs for the
power plant 1 versus LbG
Fig. 3 Change in the
government’s net tariffs for the
power plant 2 versus LbG
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very interesting, but challenging to consider the uncertainty on
other model parameters such as electricity production costs or
reservation utility of power plants.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author(s) and the source are credited.
Appendix 1










2kiklðpiklþSiklTiklCikÞr2ikl ¼ 0 ð19Þ
Now, let us define the following variables:
Mikl ¼ ðpikl þ Sikl  Tikl  CikÞ; ð20Þ
Mjkl ¼ ðpjkl þ Sjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ: ð21Þ
Using Mikl and Mjkl, we rewrite first-order conditions as
aikl þ biklðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ  cjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ
 Miklð2bikl þ 2kiklr2iklÞ þ cjklMjkl ¼ 0; ð22Þ
ajkl þ bjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ  ciklðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ
 Mjklð2bjkl þ 2kjklr2jklÞ þ ciklMikl ¼ 0; ð23Þ
By solving (22) and (23) simultaneously, we have
Mikl ¼
2ðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ½aikl þ biklðSiklTiklCikÞ  cjklðSjklTjklCjlÞ
þ cjkl½ajkl þ bjklðSjklTjklCjlÞ  ciklðSiklTiklCikÞ
( )
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
:
ð24Þ
Mjkl can be obtained in a similar manner. The p

ikl and
pjkl obtained from Eq. (7) are the optimum prices if the
utility functions are concave on pikl and pjkl. The second











Therefore, the utilities are concave functions on elec-
tricity prices. h
Proof of Proposition 1 By substituting Mikl obtained from
Lemma 1 into Eq. (4), after some mathematical manipu-
lations, the utility function can be simplified into
Uð ~PiklÞ ¼ ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞM 2ikl  Fik. h
Proof of Lemma 2 The second and the third constraints are
constraints for the power plants’ utility that are straightforward
from proposition 1. Thus, we only discuss the objective function
and the first constraint. Let us define the following notations
Dikl ¼
2ðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞaikl þ cjklajkl
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð26Þ
hikl ¼
ð2biklðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð27Þ
vjkl ¼
ð2cjklðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklbjklÞ
ð4ðbikl þ kiklr2iklÞðbjkl þ kjklr2jklÞ  cjklciklÞ
ð28Þ
Substituting Eqs. (26)–(28) into Eq. (24), we have:
Mikl¼DiklþhiklðSiklTiklCikÞþvjklðSjklTjklCjlÞ: ð29Þ
Moreover, substituting demand function (1) into gov-
ernment problem (5) we have:
min wik ~aikl þ wjl ~ajkl þ ðwjlcikl wikbiklÞpikl þ ðwikcjkl wjlbjklÞpjkl;
s:t PrfðTiklSiklÞ~aikl þ ðTjklSjklÞ~ajkl þ ððTjklSjklÞcikl
 ðTiklSiklÞbiklÞpikl þ ððTiklSiklÞcjkl
 ðTjklSjklÞbjklÞpjkl LbGg s: ð30Þ
Using Lemma 1, the problem (30) is transformed into
min wik ~aikl þ wjl~ajkl  ðwjlciklwikbiklÞðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ;
 ðwikcjklwjl bjklÞðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ þ ðwjlciklwikbiklÞMikl þ ðwikcjklwjl bjklÞMjkl
s:t Pr
ðTiklSiklÞ~aikl þ ðTjklSjklÞ~ajkl
þ ððTjklSjklÞciklðTiklSiklÞbiklÞðMikl  Sikl þ Tikl þ CikÞ
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Now, let us define the following notations
giklðhiklðwjlciklwikbiklÞ þ viklðwikcjklwjkbjklÞ
 ðwjlciklwik biklÞÞ; ð32Þ
C ¼ wik ~aikl þ wjl~ajkl þ ðwjlciklwikbiklÞDikl
þ ðwikcjklwjlbjklÞDjkl ð33Þ
Substituting Eqs. (29), (32) and (33) in problem (31), we
have
Proof of Lemma 3 Since ~aikl and ~ajkl are assumed to be
independently and normally distributed variables, the value
of y ¼ ðTiklSiklÞ~aikl  ðTjklSjklÞ~ajkl is also normally
distributed variable. It is equal to
y ¼ ððTjklSjklÞciklðTiklSiklÞbiklÞðDikl þ ðhikl  1Þ
 ðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ þ vjklðSjklTjklCjlÞÞ
 ððTiklSiklÞ cjklðTjklSjklÞbjklÞðDjkl þ ðhjkl  1Þ








It is noted that y 0 and yEðyÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VarðyÞ






p . The chance constraint of the government
model is equivalent toPrfZ  EðyÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VðyÞ
p g s, where Z is the
standardized normally distributed variable. Then, the
chance constraint of the government model holds if and
only if /1ðsÞ EðyÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
VðyÞ
p , where / is the standardized normal
distribution. With some mathematical simplifications we
have
ðTikl  SiklÞaikl þ ðTjkl  SjklÞajkl
þ ðTjklSjklÞciklðTiklSiklÞbikl
 
Dikl þ ðhikl  1Þð





































g1kl -91.4895 -512.1604 -630.6906 369.4945 -47.7980 -823.1405 805.3662 59.2742 232.6993
g2kl -109.0353 175.7468 672.0377 -421.2105 -82.8378 -152.0057 -413.5794 -493.0216 168.5081
v1kl -0.5085 -0.6354 -0.5615 -0.3631 -0.3093 -0.3390 -0.3109 -0.3270 -0.2293
v2kl -0.5155 -0.4485 -0.3741 -0.5239 -0.3381 -0.4366 -0.5740 -0.4683 -0.2369
D1kl 46.7425 54.1624 44.9004 35.9672 32.4313 30.8835 30.4241 31.2910 22.0292
D2kl 52.8162 49.0607 36.9422 50.3076 38.6132 37.1350 48.7253 43.7502 29.8931
h1kl 0.1231 0.0598 0.0389 0.1847 0.2721 0.1431 0.1754 0.2045 0.3006
h2kl 0.1070 0.0986 0.2140 0.1701 0.2822 0.2575 0.1983 0.2319 0.3195



















min Cþ giklðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ þ gjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ;
s:t Pr
ðTikl  SiklÞaikl þ ðTjkl  SjklÞajkl
þ ðTjkl  SjklÞcikl  ðTikl  SiklÞbiklÞðDikl þ hikl  1ÞðSikl  Tikl  CikÞ þ vjklðSjkl  Tjkl  CjlÞ
 
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